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I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the United States’ medical 
system was predictable.  By the time the virus was identified in patients 
in the United States, hospitals in northern Italy were already overwhelmed
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with patients with viral pneumonia and acute respiratory distress.1 Patients 
were triaged by age and health status to determine who would receive 
ventilator therapy and ICU beds.2  Of course, the reach of the virus was
not confined to Italy; after first ravaging China, COVID-19 spread rapidly 
in Europe and beyond.3 
The COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelmed many U.S. systems—
including the already-strained medical system—intended to protect and 
care for its citizens.4 In the United States, New York became the first
epicenter of the pandemic, accounting for approximately five percent of 
global COVID-19 cases by March 2020.5  Hospitals, health care providers,
and policymakers soon recognized that, in New York and beyond, they 
faced a bleak reality that—if the spread of the virus could not be controlled—
there would soon not be enough ventilators for all patients who needed 
them,6 despite hospitals practicing “surge capacity” to reduce the need for 
ventilators by canceling or postponing elective procedures that require 
ventilators.7 Across the country, alarms continue to be raised about the
potential for insufficient equipment and staff, including ventilators or dialysis 
1. See Dan Diamond & Sarah Wheaton, How the US and Italy Traded Places on 
Coronavirus, POLITICO (June 22, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/how-
the-us-and-italy-traded-places-on-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/X8HB-A8SU].
2. See Yascha Mounk, The Extraordinary Decisions Facing Italian Doctors, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/who-
gets-hospital-bed/607807/ [https://perma.cc/5W7S-D5G2]; see also Chiari Mannelli, Whose 
Life to Save? Scarce Resources Allocation in the COVID-19 Outbreak, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 364, 
364–65 (2020); Andrea Remuzzi & Giuseppe Remuzzi, COVID-19 and Italy: What Next?, 
395 LANCET 1225, 1228 (2020). 
3. PETE KINROSS ET AL., RAPIDLY INCREASING CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE OF 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) IN THE EUROPEAN UNION/EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
AREA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1 JANUARY TO 15 MARCH 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.
eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.11.2000285 [https://perma.cc/ 
HQ8Y-JV4Z].
4. Chelsea Janes et al., Surge in Virus Hospitalizations Strains Hospitals in Several 
States, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
surge-in-virus-hospitalizations-strains-hospitals-in-several-states/2020/07/08/12855e5e-
c135-11ea-864a-0dd31b9d6917_story.html [https://perma.cc/FX6W-KJSG]. 
 5. Jesse McKinley, New York City Region Is Now an Epicenter of the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22/nyregion/
Coronavirus-new-York-epicenter.html [https://perma.cc/96QZ-2B2Z].
6. Brian Rosenthal & Joseph Goldstein, N.Y. May Need 18,000 Ventilators Very 
Soon. It Is Far Short of That, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
03/17/nyregion/ny-coronavirus-ventilators.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pg 
type=Article [https://perma.cc/5J6M-UYC7]. 
7. Lewis Rubinson et al., Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a Disaster: 
A Framework for Optimizing Critical Care Surge Capacity, 133 CHEST (SUPPLEMENT) 18S, 
19S, 25S (2008). 
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machines, personal protective equipment, necessary drugs or vaccines,
and trained individuals to operate the equipment and treat patients.8 
In response to the very real possibility that there will be insufficient
resources to properly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, states have 
been developing crisis standard of care plans.9  These plans often authorize
the prioritization of patients for scarce resources based on changing 
circumstances and increased demands.10  They provide a mechanism for 
reallocating staff, facilities, and supplies to meet needs during a public 
health emergency.11 
8. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING 
TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23–27 
(2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6KK-SETY]; 
see, e.g., David Matthau, Group Warns: NJ Could Run Low on Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, 
N.J. 101.5 (Aug. 17, 2020), https://nj1015.com/group-warns-nj-could-run-low-on-covid-
19-drug-remdesivir [https://perma.cc/JT4Z-KPAV].
9. See, e.g., N.Y.C. HEALTH DEP’T, COVID-19: CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE 
PLANNING RESOURCES FOR CRITICAL CARE 1 (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/
pdf/imm/covid-19-critical-care-crisis-planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT8B-6JFN]. 
10. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
11. See, e.g., id. at 1–5. In addition to providing guidelines for allocating scarce
resources, like ventilators, during a pandemic, see, e.g., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE 
LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, VENTILATOR ALLOCATION GUIDELINES (2015), 
https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/ventilator
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK6F-993W], others have observed additional deviations
from the nonemergency standard of care contained in crisis standards of care: 
Physicians are being instructed by their states, professional associations, and
institutions to do things differently, and in ways that may violate the standard of 
care if it were not for COVID-19.  For example, during cardiac resuscitation some
physicians are being told that all patients must be intubated, rather than using manually
ventilation, like a bag.  Intubation reduces the risk of transmitting COVID-19 to 
the medical team through the patient’s coughing, but it creates other risks for the 
patient, and imposes delays.  I have received reports of physicians in some areas 
being instructed not to use cardiac catheterization on heart attack patients, due
to risks of physician exposure to COVID-19.  Other policies include mandatory
emergency intubation during thrombectomies for people experiencing stroke. 
These procedures would ordinarily not involve intubation, but for the risk of
COVID-19 being aerosolized during the procedure.  If there is an injury or bad
outcome from the intubation, a patient who did not have COVID-19 may question
the wisdom of intubating them.  [¶]  In addition to taking extra precautions during
procedures, physicians are also being instructed by their employers to reschedule or
cancel cancer, heart, and lung interventions that they think can wait several weeks.
Teneille R. Brown, When the Wrong People Are Immune, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 10–11
(2020) (footnotes omitted) (citing Data Shows Reduction in U.S. Heart Attack Activations 
During COVID-19 Pandemic, CATH LAB DIG. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.cathlabdigest.com/ 
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Although scarce resource allocation protocols vary tremendously from 
state to state, they often are based on the principle of saving the most lives
possible.12  As a general rule, they focus on allocating resources solely on 
clinical medical criteria, in an effort to avoid making decisions based on 
race, gender, age, or other social criteria.13  Overall, these plans should be
made ethically, fairly, and transparently, in order to ensure public trust.  
In most instances, these triage protocols are not binding law; rather, they 
are state-level guidance that the governor can “trigger” at the time of, or 
after, a declaration of emergency.14 
II. CALLS FOR LIABILITY PROTECTIONS
In a noncrisis setting, the prevailing medical standard of care focuses
on the needs of each individual patient and is centered on the principle of
informed consent.15  Although the exact language varies across jurisdictions,
under normal circumstances, physicians or surgeons are expected to exercise 
“the degree of care and skill that a physician or surgeon of the same medical 
specialty would use under similar circumstances.”16 Due to the dearth of 
necessary resources and trained professionals during a public health 
emergency, the standard of care that clinicians may be able to provide 
during the COVID-19 pandemic may, by necessity, depart significantly from 
standard nonemergency medical practice.17 
Thus, clinicians, health care institutions, and policymakers have expressed 
concern about potential legal liability for following crisis standards of 
care.18  Adhering to crisis standards of care may expose health care providers
content/data-shows-reduction-us-heart-attack-activations-during-covid-19-pandemic [https://
perma.cc/EUC9-SP36])). 
12. John L. Hick & Daniel T. O’Laughlin, Concept of Operations for Triage of 
Mechanical Ventilation in an Epidemic, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 223, 225 (2006); 
Mannelli, supra note 2, at 365; Rubinson, supra note 7, at 20S. 
13. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
14. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 202, 
216. As of July 2020, only one state had “triggered” its crisis standard of care.  See Jeremy 
Duda, As Covid-19 Worsens, AZ is the First State to Enact ‘Crisis Care’ Standards, ARIZ. 
MIRROR (July 3, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.azmirror.com/2020/07/03/as-covid-19-
worsens-az-is-the-first-state-to-enact-crisis-care-standards [https://perma.cc/8EKN-CJVP];
see, e.g., Valerie Gutmann Koch & Susie A. Han, COVID in NYC: What New York Did, 
and Should Have Done, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 153, 154 (2020). 
15. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 206. 
16. Medical Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
17. Valerie Gutmann Koch & Beth E. Roxland, Unique Proposals for Limiting Legal 
Liability and Encouraging Adherence to Ventilator Allocation Guidelines in an Influenza 
Pandemic, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 467, 469 (2013). 
18. I. Glenn Cohen, Andrew M. Crespo & Douglas B. White, Potential Legal Liability
for Withdrawing or Withholding Ventilators During COVID-19, JAMA NETWORK (Apr.
1, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2764239 [https://perma.cc/
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and entities to considerable costs and burdens, including the risk of both 
civil and criminal liability.  For example, health care workers are taking 
on significant risk running codes on patients with COVID-19, often without 
adequate personal protective equipment.19  Calls for fair treatment of health 
care providers20 have led to support for immunity provisions for those who
sacrifice their own well-being in service of the public good.21 
Most states have protections in place for unpaid volunteers who provide 
care during a declared emergency.22  However, nonvolunteer clinicians, 
nurses, and other health care providers may be hesitant to conform to crisis 
standards of care—despite their significant public health goals—due to concerns 
about liability arising from injury or death.  Unless proper and adequate 
legal protections are in place, a health care provider risks lawsuits, financial 
penalties and jail time, higher medical malpractice insurance rates, and 
damage to one’s reputation.23 
These concerns are particularly acute where crisis standards of care
recommend ventilator withdrawal without patient consent.24  Some  
commentators assert that there may be a legal distinction between withholding 
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments or therapies, such as ventilators, 
and note the potential for increased liability concerns with the latter.25 
AMH6-8563]; Jeremy Samuel Faust, Make This Simple Change to Free Up Hospital Beds 
Now, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 5:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/03/15/make-this-simple-change-free-up-hospital-beds-now [https://perma.cc/FXT5- 
5KR7]; Valerie Gutmann Koch, Govind Persad & Wendy Netter Epstein, Pandemic Guidelines,
Not Changed Malpractice Rules, Are the Right Response to Covid-19, BILL HEALTH (Mar. 
30, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/30/pandemic-guidelines-mal 
practice-covid19 [https://perma.cc/EF8T-HEVD]. 
19. See, e.g., Soumya Karlamangla, A Nurse Without an N95 Mask Raced in to
Treat a ‘Code Blue’ Patient. She Died 14 Days Later, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2020, 7:58 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-10/nurse-death-n95-covid-19-
patients-coronavirus-hollywood-presbyterian [https://perma.cc/2VR2-5N5H].
20. Caitriona L. Cox, ‘Healthcare Heroes’: Problems with Media Focus on Heroism 
from Healthcare Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 510, 512 
(2020) (discussing the principle of reciprocity, which “is of significant importance to 
social contract theories: in return for accepting personal risk in fulfilling their duty to treat, 
healthcare workers expect reciprocal social obligations”). 
21. Brown, supra note 11, at 9, 11. 
22. Sara Rosenbaum, Mary-Beth Harty & Jennifer Sheer, State Laws Extending 
Comprehensive Legal Liability Protections for Professional Health-Care Volunteers During 
Public Health Emergencies, 123 PUB. HEALTH REP. 238, 239 (2008). 
23. See Cohen, Crespo & Douglas, supra note 18. 
24. See id.
 25. See, e.g., id.; Philip D. Levin & Charles L. Sprung, Withdrawing and Withholding 
Life-Sustaining Therapies Are Not the Same, 9 CRIT. CARE 230, 230–31 (2005).  But see 
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Importantly, questions of legal liability for providing care during a 
public health crisis predate the COVID-19 pandemic.26  Many argue that
such liability protections may be necessary when, due to the circumstances 
of the emergency, a state faces scarce resources and the state activates its 
crisis standards of care.27  Thus, lawmakers, policymakers, and professional 
societies have called for laws that provide liability shields for care that
may deviate from nonemergency care provided during the pandemic.28 
For example, on March 24, 2020, Health and Human Services Secretary
Alexander Azar sent a letter to all state governors, stating, “[f]or health 
care professionals to feel comfortable serving in expanded capacities on 
the frontlines of the COVID-19 emergency, it is imperative that they feel
shielded from medical tort liability.”29  In doing so, he recommended that 
states issue public guidance, “outlining the available liability protections 
during the COVID-19 emergency,” and calling on states to “quickly 
develop a list of the relevant state liability protections and waivers for 
health professionals during a national or state emergency.”30  Likewise, 
the American Medical Association recommended that states evaluate 
whether their “laws should be extended to fill gaps necessary to address 
the potential liability of physicians providing care in response to COVID-
19 and/or care decisions made based on government or health care facility
COVID-19 directives.”31 
Asha Devereaux et al., Summary of Suggestions from the Task Force for Mass Critical 
Care Summit, 133 CHEST (SUPPLEMENT) 1S, 6S (2008) (“Rationing should apply equally 
to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments based on the principle that
withholding and withdrawing care are ethically equivalent.”); Withholding or Withdrawing
Life-Sustaining Treatment: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 5.3, AM. MED. ASS’N, https:// 
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/withholding-or-withdrawing-life-sustaining-
treatment [https://perma.cc/G3MR-8BU4] (“While there may be an emotional difference
between not initiating an intervention at all and discontinuing it later in the course of care, 
there is no ethical difference between withholding and withdrawing treatment.”). 
26. Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1926 (2008); Koch & Roxland, supra note 17, at 
469. 
27. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 9–11. 
28. See, e.g., Letter from Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to 
Governors 1, 3 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsbn.org/HHS_Secretary_Letter_to_States_
Licensing_Waivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAH6-39H2] [hereinafter Azar Letter].
29. Id. at 3. 
30. Id.
 31. AM. MED. ASS’N & MED. PROF’L LIAB. ASS’N, COVID-19: RECOMMENDATIONS 
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III. EXISTING LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
In the United States, states are generally responsible for the regulation 
of medical practice.32  Thus, there are no uniform federal rules or guidelines
for how to allocate scarce resources in a public health emergency.  As a 
result, there is significant variation among states regarding if, and how, 
legal liability protections might be provided to physicians, nurses, and 
others who provide medical care during a public health emergency.  No 
uniform legal protection exists for the provision of care under disaster 
circumstances or pursuant to state resource allocation guidance. 
A. State Laws Granting Liability Protections to Health Care 
Providers in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many states already had legal rules 
or guidance regarding malpractice liability protections for care provided
during a public health emergency in place.33 Various laws provide different
levels of protection: some laws provide civil liability immunity, some provide 
both civil and criminal immunity, and some states provide neither.34  Further,
some liability protections are ensured legislatively, through general laws 
that protect clinicians from legal liability, absent willful acts or gross 
negligence,35 when they provide care pursuant to state directives or crisis
standards of care. Other states have issued executive orders, or rules to 
be followed only during the pendency of the emergency.36  In most cases, 
executive orders have defined expiration dates—either a date written into 
the law or at the termination of a declared emergency.37 
32. See, e.g., Azar Letter, supra note 28, at 3 (illustrating the roles of states regulating
their own medical practices with the federal government in an advisory role). 
33. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1937. 
34. See id. at 1947–49. 
35. Generally, gross negligence is more than just an egregious form of negligence 
and can more appropriately be defined as willful misconduct or intentional wrongdoing.  
Koch & Roxland, supra note 17, at 474.  Gross negligence differs “in kind, not only degree, 
from claims of ordinary negligence” and is “conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for 
the rights of others or ‘smacks’ of intentional wrongdoing.”  See, e.g., Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. 
Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 1993) (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal 
Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1992). 
36. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1923, 1936, 1947–50. 
37. See, e.g., E. Lee Bernick & Charles W. Wiggins, The Governor’s Executive
Order: An Unknown Power T   OC  OV T EV, 16 S . & L . G ’ R . 3, 6 (1984).  It is important to note 
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As of June 2020, thirty-seven states provide some sort of civil liability 
protections for physicians who provided care in a public health emergency.38 
provider to liability, even with immunity provisions.  See Koch & Roxland, supra note 17, 
at 489 (“[A]rguably, immunity-conferring statutes that exempt ‘willful misconduct’ may
not adequately protect health care providers who remove ventilator therapy from a patient
consistent with state-promulgated guidelines. Such an act might be considered to be willful or
in conscious disregard of the safety of the individual harmed and therefore beyond the 
protective scope of the law.” (citing Daren P. Mareiniss, Frederick Levy & Linda Regan, 
ICU Triage: The Potential Legal Liability of Withdrawing ICU Care During a Catastrophic 
Event, 6 AM. J. DISASTER MED. 329, 333 (2011)).
38. ALA. CODE § 31-9-16(b) (2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8659(a) (West 2020); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-711.5(1)–(2) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3144 (2020); 
IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-1 (2020); IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-
915(b) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2)(c) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY 
§ 14-3A-06 (LexisNexis 2020); MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-
25-37 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. 10-3-110(1) (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3082
(McKinney 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.2311 (LexisNexis 2020); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-570 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 20-9-3
(2020); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.007 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
13-2.6 (LexisNexis 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
225.02 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020); 2020 Ky. Acts 310; S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. 
Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020); S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 
2020); 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7.(a); S.B. 3002, 2020 Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Utah 
2020); S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 
(Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://
perma.cc/ RF59-WZ7L]; Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor. 
arkansas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKP9-
GLRF]; Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-
the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/5E7X-4MQK]; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https:// 
gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders; Haw. Exec. 
Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 
04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distribution-signed-1.pdf [https://perma. cc/DA6G-
FBRZ]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/
Executive-Orders/Executiveorder2020-37.aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZEL-N8ZQ] (expired June
27, 2020); Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-
con`tent/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRM9-GRZM]; Mich.
Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-
387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/M6YE-MYXD] (rescinded); Miss.
Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/executive orders/ 
executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MA9-SRA8] (rescinded); Nev. Exec. Order
Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1, 2020), http://gov.nv.gov/News/
Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration_of_Emergency_Directive_011/ 
[https://perma.cc/DV5E-D5WK]; N.J. Exec. Order No. 112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/
infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9BG-8GYG]; N.Y. Exec. 
Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/ 
files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWV-XK6R] (rescinded Aug. 22, 
2020); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-13 (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
executive/1935.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NQG-WD6P]; Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections
for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-care-professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf 
980
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Of those, twenty-one states had promulgated new protections specifically
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.39  Sixteen of those twenty-two
states adopted legal liability protections through executive orders (EOs) 
or a directive by the governor, which carries the force of law.40 
[https://perma.cc/N4YX-RB8Q]; R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ2Q-
K5NU]; Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor. 
vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE
%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4V-PR3E].
39. WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020); 2020 Ky. Acts 310; SS.B. 2640, 191st Gen.
Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020); 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7(a); SS.B. SF1002, 
65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://azgovernor.gov/file/34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/RF59-
WZ7L]; Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/
images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKP9-GLRF]; Conn. 
Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/ 
Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?la=en [https://
perma.cc/5E7X-4MQK]; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https:// 
gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.
cc/2SX8-AHP4]; Haw. Exec. Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii. 
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distribution-
signed-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA6G-FBRZ]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020),
https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/Executiveorder2020-37.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/5ZEL-N8ZQ] (expired June 27, 2020); Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GRM9-GRZM]; Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https:// 
www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/
M6YE-MYXD] (rescinded); Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.
sos.ms.gov/content/executiveorders/executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MA9-
SRA8] (rescinded); Nev. Exec. Order Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1, 
2020), http://gov.nv.gov/News/Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration
_of_Emergency_Directive_011/ [https://perma.cc/DV5E-D5WK]; N.J. Exec. Order No. 
112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B9BG-8GYG]; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor. 
ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWV-
XK6R] (rescinded Aug. 22, 2020); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-13 (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/1935.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NQG-WD6P];
Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-care-
professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4YX-RB8Q]; R.I. Exec. 
Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-
Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ2Q-K5NU]; Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 
9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM
%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4V-PR3E]. 
40. Valerie Gutmann Koch, How States are Protecting Health Care Providers from 
Legal Liability in the Covid-19 Pandemic, BILL OF HEALTH (May 5, 2020), https://blog.
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Importantly, all applicable laws that provide civil immunity for providing
medical care during an emergency do so conditionally.41  In other words, 
if the physician has engaged in willful or intentional misconduct, gross 
negligence, recklessness, or has provided care in the absence of good 
faith, the physician would still be subject to civil liability.  
Only three states—Maryland, New York, and New Jersey—provide 
protections to physicians from criminal liability that may result during the
public health emergency.42 
B. What Types of Actions Are Covered by States’ Health
Care Provider Liability Shields? 
Civil liability protections also vary significantly regarding the types of 
actions that are protected.  Some states’ liability shields immunize injury 
or death that occurs specifically where the health care providers comply
with federal, state, local, or institutional plans, guidelines, or crisis standards 
of care.43  For example, Colorado’s law is tailored to actions taken in
compliance with state crisis standards of care or pandemic-related guidelines, 
covering harm that occurs when the health care provider has “compl[ied] 
completely with board of health rules regarding the emergency epidemic 
and with executive orders regarding the disaster emergency.”44  Although
this law ostensibly provides liability protections for health care providers 
who negligently care for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients, it 
is narrow in the sense that it only covers actions taken in compliance with 
emergency state rules.  Similarly, Minnesota’s law provides immunity to 
health care providers if the negligence occurred while the health care provider 
was “acting consistent with emergency plans.”45  Texas’s law limits liability 
protections to those actions taken “in compliance with orders or instructions 
of the department or a health authority.”46 And Wisconsin immunizes health
care professionals providing services during the state of emergency, consistent 
with any of the following: “1. [a]ny direction, guidance, recommendation, 
or other statement made by a federal, state, or local official to address or 
in response to the emergency or disaster” or “2. [a]ny guidance published 
petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/05/legal-liability-health-care-covid19-coronavirus-
pandemic [https://perma.cc/TD8E-V99V]; see sources cited supra note 39. 
41. Koch, supra note 40.
 42. Id. 
43. See Liability Protections for Health Care Professionals During COVID-19, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/
liability-protections-health-care-professionals-during-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/WXX6-
V9CU].
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24- 33.5-711.5(2) (2019). 
45. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019). 
46. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 81.007 (West 2019). 
982
KOCH_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2021 3:03 PM     
  











    












     
 
[VOL. 57:  973, 2020] CSCs and Liability Shields
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
by the department of health services, the federal department of health and 
human services, or any divisions or agencies of the federal department of 
health and human services.”47 
Some states limit their liability shields to negligent care of patients 
specifically diagnosed with COVID-19, for whom the standard of care
may be modified due to scarce resources.48  Pennsylvania grants immunity
to health care professionals “engaged in disaster services activities” but 
only for COVID-19-related medical and health treatment or services.49 
Rhode Island’s executive order from April 10, 2020 explicitly states 
that its law provides no immunity for “negligence that occurs in the course
of providing patient care to patients without COVID-19 whose care has
not been altered by the existence of this disaster emergency.”50  Kentucky
also has narrowly drafted its immunity-conferring provisions, restricting 
its protections only to negligent care of patients diagnosed with COVID-
19, and then clarifying the types of actions the law contemplates.51 The law
provides immunity to health care providers who render care or treatment 
of a COVID-19 patient during the state of emergency, including prescription 
of medicines for off-label use to attempt to combat the COVID-19 virus 
in accordance with the federal Right to Try Act,52 as long as the health
care provider acts as an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent health care 
provider would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.53 
47. WIS. STAT. § 895.4801(2)(b) (2019). 
48. See Susan Jaffe, As Congress Weighs COVID Liability Protections, States 
Shield Health Providers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 15, 2020), https://khn.org/news/as-
congress-weighs-covid-liability-protections-states-shield-health-providers [https://perma.cc/
B2VA-HBGK].
49. Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 
2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-
care-professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5F-ZFLX].
50. R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/ 
orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PMV-YREN]. 
51.  2020 Ky. Acts 310. 
52. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to
Try Act, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (largely codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360bbb-0a). 
53.  2020 Ky. Acts 310. 
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In contrast, many other states—including Arizona,54 Arkansas,55 
Connecticut,56 Iowa,57 Maryland,58 Massachusetts,59 Michigan,60 New 
Jersey,61 New York,62 Oklahoma,63 Vermont,64 and Virginia65—provide 
54. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/
34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/6FQ6-7JYB] (providing immunity 
if the harm occurred providing “medical services in support of the public health emergency”). 
55. Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/ 
images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE68-T662] (providing
immunity if the harm occurred providing “medical services in support of the State’s response 
to the COVID-19 outbreak or the implementation of measures to control the causes of the
COVID-19 epidemic”).
56. Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-
of-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/K74X-LJJL] (providing immunity if the harm occurred “providing
health care services in support of the State’s COVID-19 response”). 
57. Iowa Exec. Order No. 2020-19 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/ 
Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/SQ6Z-D92Q] (providing 
immunity if the harm occurred “in the course of rendering assistance to the State by
providing health care services in response to the COVID-19 outbreak”). 
58. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-06 (LexisNexis 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred under a catastrophic health emergency proclamation). 
59. S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred in the course of providing health care services during the period of 
the COVID-19 emergency). 
60. Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/ 
whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/8Y7K-AZDC] 
(rescinded) (providing immunity if the harm occurred “in support of this state’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic”). 
61. N.J. Exec. Order No. 112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/
pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGT4-JG63] (providing immunity if the harm occurred
in the course of providing healthcare services “in support of the State’s COVID-19 response”). 
The state’s criminal liability protections are more limited, immunizing providers 
and facilities who make scarce resource allocation decisions pursuant to “a scarce critical
resource allocation policy that at a minimum incorporates the core principles identified by
the Commissioner of Health in an executive directive or administrative order.” S.B. 2333, 
219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020). 
62. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
no-20210-continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-
emergency [https://perma.cc/P6E8-8CTP] (rescinded Aug. 22, 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred “in the course of providing medical services in support of the State’s
response to the COVID-19 outbreak”). 
63. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020) (providing immunity if the harm occurred
when the health care provider “renders emergency care, aid, shelter or other assistance during 
a natural disaster or catastrophic event”). 
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019); Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 
9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM 
%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQA5-DA37]
(providing liability protections for emergency management service or response activities).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2020) (providing liability protections for
healthcare providers for the injury or wrongful death of any person arising from “the
delivery or withholding of health care when (i) a state or local emergency has been or is
984
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civil liability protections for injury or death that occurs due to medical
services that are provided in support of the state’s response to the COVID-
19 pandemic.  This is a much broader level of protection, ostensibly 
covering any harms to patients, irrespective of COVID-19 diagnosis or
treatment, as long as the health care provider’s actions were “in support
of the State’s response” to the pandemic.66 In other words, the health care
provider’s actions need not be in accordance with a specific crisis standard 
of care or guideline to be protected. 
Mississippi’s immunity-conferring provision is similarly broad, immunizing
health care providers for harm that occurs due to care provided “in support
of the State’s COVID-19 response.”67  However, the law also attempts to
clarify this language, stating that the protections include, but are not 
limited to, “acts or omissions undertaken because of a lack of resources 
attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic that renders the Healthcare 
Professional or Healthcare Facility unable to provide the level or manner 
of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.”68  Like Vermont’s executive order, which also 
provides a nonexclusive list of emergency response services,69 Mississippi’s
law could be interpreted to apply to any negligent care that occurs, regardless 
of whether it is due to scarce resources or whether the provider is specifically 
following a crisis standard of care. 
IV. EXISTING LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
Many states have instituted liability protections for institutions, such as 
nursing homes and other long-term care facilities.70  Institutional liability 
subsequently declared in response to such disaster, and (ii) the emergency and subsequent 
conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care 
provider unable to provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been 
required in the absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful
death at issue”).
66.  Koch, Persad & Epstein, supra note 18. 
67. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/
executiveorders/executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/F47W-FLTL] (rescinded). 
68. Id.
69. Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor. 
vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE
%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQA5-DA37].
70. Kenneth Yood & Theresa Thompson, Data Reporting, Patient Access and 
Malpractice Liability: Nursing Homes and Long-Term Care Facilities Command Federal 
and State Attention During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, SHEPPARD HEALTH 
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protections certainly are not novel to the circumstances of the COVID-19
pandemic; some states extended civil immunity to nursing homes and 
other facilities before 2020, including Indiana,71 Iowa,72 Minnesota,73 and 
Virginia.74  As of late June 2020, many states had granted nursing homes 
and other long-term care facilities immunity from civil liability, either by 
executive order or statute.75 Arizona,76 Connecticut,77 Georgia,78 Hawaii,79 
Illinois,80 Indiana,81 Iowa,82 Kansas,83 Massachusetts,84 Michigan,85 
Minnesota,86 Mississippi,87 New Jersey,88 New York,89 North Carolina,90 
L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.sheppardhealthlaw.com/2020/04/articles/corona
virus/ong-term-care-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/S54Y-C5WR]. 
71. See IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-3 (2020). 
72. See IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020). 
73. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019). 
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2020). 
75. Nina A. Kohn & Jessica L. Roberts, Nursing Homes Need Increased Staffing, 
Not Legal Immunity, HILL (May 23, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/health
care/499286-nursing-homes-need-increased-staffing-not-legal-immunity [https://perma.cc/
L6C9-FHYR]. Professors Nina Kohn and Jessica Roberts evaluated state legal liability 
protections, and found that as of late May 2020, nineteen states granted nursing homes 
new immunity from civil liability either by executive order or statute.  Id.  Other states’ 
liability protections predate this particular public health emergency. 
76. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/ 
34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/6FQ6-7JYB].
77. Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-
of-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/K74X-LJJL].
78. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/ 
executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/VQ3V-NLVU]. 
79. See Haw. Exec. Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distribution-
signed-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ47-MKFC].
80. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Documents/ 
ExecOrders/2020/ExecutiveOrder-2020-37.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HQN-QG87] (expired 
June 27, 2020).
81. See IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-3 (2020). 
82. See IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020). 
83. Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H7G-5UCG]. 
84.  S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020). 
85. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020) (rescinded), https://content.
govdelivery.com/attachments/MIEOG/2020/03/29/file_attachments/1413927/EO%2020
20-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5NN-UJH6].
86. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019). 
87. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/Content/ 
documents/about_us/WhatsNew/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4MT-DXE8] (rescinded). 
88.  S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020). 
89. New York Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3082 (McKinney 2020). 
90. 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7(a) (providing immunity for “civil liability for 
any harm or damages” caused by acts or omissions in the rendering of health care 
986
KOCH_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2021 3:03 PM     
  







   
 





      
   







   
[VOL. 57:  973, 2020] CSCs and Liability Shields
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Oklahoma,91 Pennsylvania,92 Rhode Island,93 Utah,94 Vermont,95 Virginia,96 
Wisconsin,97 and Wyoming98 all granted civil liability shields to institutions, 
including nursing homes, for injury or death that occurs due to negligence 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Just as there is tremendous variation 
between the types of actions that health care provider immunity-conferring 
laws protect, there is a similar spectrum of protections for health care 
institutions, including nursing homes. 
Although most state statutes enacted before 2020 only provided civil 
immunity to health care providers and not institutions, importantly, almost
half of the laws and executive orders promulgated specifically in response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic grant liability protections to both health care 
providers and institutions.99  In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a
few states initially provided liability shields solely to health care providers, 
only to later amend their rules to grant similar liability protections to health 
care institutions.100  For example, until 2020, Wyoming provided immunity
services, if those health care services are impacted directly or indirectly by decisions
made “in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic” and are provided in 
good faith).
91. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020); S.B. 1496, 57th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 
2020).
92. Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 
2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-care-
professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGX7-H89P].
93. R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/ 
orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5794-GY5N].
94. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-13-2.6 to -2.7 (LexisNexis 2020). 
95. Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.
gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER% 
2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XNV-48L]; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019). 
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2020) (defining “Health care provider” as “a
person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this Commonwealth to provide health 
care . . .”). 
97. WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020). 
98. See S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020). 
99. See, e.g., Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.
ms.gov/Content/documents/about_us/WhatsNew/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4MT-DXE8] 
(rescinded).  But see, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor. 
arkansas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXW7-Q6T6];
Nev. Exec. Order Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1, 2020), http://gov.nv. 
gov/News/Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration_of_Emergency_
Directive_011/ [https://perma.cc/X29R-ZHVV]. No state has granted immunity provisions to
only institutions and not health care providers. 
100. See Randall R. Fearnow et al., COVID-19: Illinois Executive Order Grants Civil 
Immunity to Assisted Living Providers, QUARLES & BRADY LLP (May 11, 2020), 
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from liability to “health care provider[s] or other person[s]” who respond 
to the public health emergency.101  On May 20, 2020, in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the state amended its existing law, adding “business 
entit[ies]” to the those covered by the provision.102 
Likewise, New York State’s extension of liability protections to facilities
such as nursing homes and other long-term care facilities is representative 
of the lobbying power these institutions have.103  In late March 2020,
Governor Cuomo issued an executive order providing broad civil and criminal 
liability protections for health care professionals, including physicians
and nurses, if the injury or death occurred “in the course of providing 
medical services in support of the State’s response to the COVID-19 
outbreak.”104  However, after “aggressive” advocacy by the Greater New 
York Hospital Association (GNYHA),105 language was included in the 
state’s annual budget that also provided broad immunity provisions to 
nursing homes as well.106 
Just like with civil immunity provisions for health care professionals
who provide care during the pandemic, almost without exception, states’ 
civil immunity provisions for health care institutions exclude willful or
intentional misconduct, gross negligence, recklessness, or the provision 
of care in the absence of good faith.
Further, New York107 and New Jersey108 extend criminal immunity to
health care facilities that provide care during the pandemic.  However, New 
https://www.quarles.com/publications/covid-19-illinois-executive-order-grants-civil-
immunity-to-assisted-living-providers/ [https://perma.cc/V3NT-89SD]; Tara Sklar 
& Nicolas Paul Terry, States Are Making It Harder to Sue Nursing Homes Over COVID-
19: Why Immunity from Lawsuits Is a Problem, CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020, 8:19 AM),
https://theconversation.com/states-are-making-it-harder-to-sue-nursing-homes-over-
covid-19-why-immunity-from-lawsuits-is-a-problem-139820 [https://perma.cc/VZ2F-
L5B6]; Laura Strickler & Adiel Kaplan, Nursing Home Industry Pushes for Immunity from 
Lawsuits During Coronavirus Emergency, NBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/nursing-home-industry-pushes-immunity-
lawsuits-during-coronavirus-emergency-n1192001 [https://perma.cc/B7BT-NNTA].
101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-114(a) (2020). 
102.  S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020). 
103. David Sirota, Cuomo Gave Immunity to Nursing Home Executives After Big Campaign 
Donations, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2020), http://theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/26/ 
andrew-cuomo-nursing-home-execs-immunity [https://perma.cc/3LHM-DG4J].
104. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/33BR-2GL3] (rescinded 
Aug. 22, 2020).
105. Sirota, supra note 103. 
106. Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 3082 (2020). 
107. Id. 
108.  S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020). 
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York’s criminal liability protections are broader than New Jersey’s.109 
New York’s law seems to allow for more discretion for providers and
facilities, providing criminal liability protections for facilities who
(a) . . . arrang[e] for or provid[e] health care services pursuant to a COVID-19 
emergency rule or otherwise in accordance with applicable law; [and] (b) the act 
or omission occurs in the course of arranging for or providing health care services 
and the treatment of the individual is impacted by the health care facility’s or 
health care professional’s decisions or activities in response to or as a result of 
the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the state’s directives.110 
In contrast, New Jersey’s criminal immunity provision is limited to
injury or death that occurs “[i]n connection with the allocation of 
mechanical ventilators or other scarce medical resources, if the health care 
facility . . . adopts and adheres to a scarce critical resource allocation policy 
that at a minimum incorporates the core principles identified by the
Commissioner of Health in an executive directive or administrative order.”111 
V. WHEN –AND TO WHOM–SHOULD STATES GRANT IMMUNITY? 
Immunity provisions are justified, but in limited circumstances. This
Part will (1) propose the most appropriate use of liability shields and (2) 
provide support for this proposal.
A. The Proposal 
Liability protections are most appropriate in instances where health care 
providers—including, but not limited to, physicians and surgeons, nurse
practitioners, nurses, and physicians’ assistants—and, in limited circumstances,
hospitals and other health care institutions, follow, in good faith, state crisis 
standards of care.  Immunity provisions are appropriate when care is provided 
pursuant to local, state, or federal rules, guidance, or protocols that are
modified from the “norm” and necessitated by emergency circumstances.
Blanket provisions providing nursing home immunity are inappropriate. 
Rather, we should determine liability protections based on whether (1) the 
federal government, state government, local government, professional society, 
or medical institution has provided rules, guidance, or crisis standards of 
care, elucidating the modifications to the existing standard of care required
109. Compare PUB. HEALTH § 3082, with N.J. S.B. 2333. 
110. PUB. HEALTH § 3082.
111.  N.J. S.B. 2333. 
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during the state of emergency; and (2) there is an identified need to extend
legal protections to providers or institutions, based on perceived reluctance to
follow crisis standards of care intended to save lives, due to fear of liability. 
In other words, liability protections are only appropriate when providers 
provide care pursuant to rules, guidance, or protocols intended to respond 
to the circumstances of the emergency.
Further, immunity provisions should serve the following purposes: they 
should (1) have the goal of saving the most lives by ensuring or increasing 
bed, equipment, and staffing capacity, and provide the highest standard of 
care possible, given the circumstances of the pandemic; (2) avoid placing
blame on providers for events beyond their control, and (3) ensure fair 
treatment of frontline health care providers who risk their health and lives 
during a public health emergency. 
B. The Justification 
Although this proposal for liability protections is much narrower than
what many states and some other policymakers have proposed, it is more 
likely to ensure accountability and protect vulnerable patients. 
Importantly, many legal experts agree that the common law legal standard
of care is adaptable to changing circumstances, and therefore would adjust
to the needs of medical care in a pandemic.112  The standard of care is, by
necessity, flexible. So it is technically unnecessary to provide immunity 
for good faith decisions made by institutions or health care providers who 
provide care during the pandemic.113  Rather, activating and publicizing 
112. Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18; see, e.g., George J. Annas, Standard
of Care–In Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2128 
(2010); Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1926; Kristi L. Koenig, Hoon Chin Steven Lim & 
Shin-Han Tsai, Crisis Standards of Care: Refocusing Health Care Goals During 
Catastrophic Disasters and Emergencies, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL MED. 159, 161 
(2011) (“Being a flexible doctrine, it is the same regardless of the circumstances—
understood simply as doing what you can under the circumstances, with the patient’s 
informed consent.” (citing Annas, supra, at 2126–31)); Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75 
(“Conduct that would be negligent in normal times may be permissible during a pandemic.”); 
Mark A. Rothstein, Malpractice Immunity for Volunteer Physicians in Public Health 
Emergencies: Adding Insult to Injury, 38 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 149, 150 (2010) (“[I]n stark 
contrast to suggestions by some ‘altered standards of care’ advocates, the current standard 
of care applied to all medical malpractice cases is sufficiently flexible and situation-
specific that it need not be altered.”).  But see Mareiniss, Levy & Regan, supra note 37 
(arguing that relying on the flexibility of the legal standard of care may be inadequate and 
therefore special immunities and protections may be required). 
113. The standard of care is adaptable to emergency circumstances in non-pandemic 
circumstances, particularly in the context of triage decisions.  See, e.g., Jonathan Glauser, 
Rationing and the Role of the Emergency Department as Society’s Safety Net, 8 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 1101, 1101 (2001); Susan L. Albin et al., Evaluation of Emergency Room 
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pandemic response plans and crisis standards of care, which authorize the 
prioritization of patients for scarce resources based on their capacity to
benefit from treatment, may be sufficient to provide legal protections for 
those who follow such guidelines.114 
Despite the relative consensus regarding the legal protections afforded 
by the activation or implementation of crisis standards of care, by shifting 
the degree of care expected under the circumstances, those who provide 
medical care on the frontlines of a public health emergency might remain
concerned about deviating from the nonemergency standard of care.
Consequently, the intention behind immunity provisions for health care 
providers who administer care during a pandemic is to encourage frontline
health care providers, when confronted with difficult or seemingly impossible 
decisions, to do their best during the worst of circumstances.115  Although
immunity provisions may not be technically required to protect providers 
who provide medical care pursuant to crisis standards of care during a public 
health emergency, local governments should work to alleviate doctors’ and 
other health care providers’ uncertainty about malpractice liability when 
providing appropriate medical care to patients during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Not only will laws that provide liability protections potentially encourage 
adherence to crisis standards of care in a pandemic, thereby resulting in 
more lives saved, we also owe a responsibility to those physicians, nurses, 
and other health care providers who risk their own health and lives to save 
others.116  Protecting health care providers from legal liability will ostensibly
result in them being more likely to follow crisis standards of care and 
saving the most lives possible, without fear of punishment for doing so.  
Otherwise, even more people may die. 
Triage Performed by Nurses, 65 EMERGENCY ROOM TRIAGE 1063, 1063 (1975) (noting 
that, historically, triage has been a common part of emergency care for nurses).
114.  Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18. 
115. See Brown, supra note 11, at 9–12 (“This article advocates for removing the 
possibility of a medical malpractice claim for individual physicians and independent health 
care providers, when they are complying with published state, professional, or institutional 
COVID-19 policies in good faith.”). 
116. Id. at 12–13 (“Health care providers are under an inordinate amount of stress as 
they expose themselves to a serious or deadly disease, often while working incredibly long 
hours.  The extenuating circumstances of a pandemic necessitate immunity for physicians 
who are doing their best to bravely make critical decisions, with imperfect information, 
institutional and professional directives that run against the normal standard of care, and 
with highly constrained resources.”). 
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Thus, because these scarce resource allocation protocols and other crisis 
standards of care depart significantly from standard nonemergency medical
practice, it is appropriate that states formalize these plans, thereby providing 
some degree of legal protection—perhaps immunity—for following them.117 
However, calls for protections for health care providers and institutions, 
in order to encourage them to follow modified or crisis standards of care
in emergency circumstances, are being co-opted by politicians and 
lobbying groups in an effort to extend legal immunity to those who would 
provide substandard care.118  Immunity provisions for nursing homes and
other institutions have been embraced by some proponents as an extension 
of protections for frontline “heroes” in the fight against COVID-19.119 For
example, in late April 2020, Senator Mitch McConnell made headlines, 
announcing that he would not support the federal stimulus package if 
Congress did not include liability protections against COVID-related suits 
for businesses, including nursing homes.120 
But the justification of encouraging good medical decisions pursuant to 
crisis standards of care is not served by the broad provisions contained in
many state laws that provide immunity for all care.  Thus, advocacy groups, 
patients’ rights advocates, and others have argued that extending liability 
protections to long-term care facilities, including nursing homes—which 
account for more than half of coronavirus-related deaths121—is at best ill-
advised, and at worst, deadly.  Generally, immunity provisions for nursing 
homes are not directed at encouraging providers to follow state guidelines 
or crisis standards of care in a public health emergency in order to save 
117.  Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18. 
118. See id.
119. Debbie Cenziper et al., As Nursing Home Residents Died, New Covid-19
Protections Shielded Companies from Lawsuits. Families Say That Hides the Truth, WASH. 
POST (June 8, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/08/ 
nursing-home-immunity-laws/ [https://perma.cc/FP9V-7FB8]; Faced with 20,000 Dead, 
Care Homes Seek Shield from Lawsuits, FOX 11 NEWS (May 3, 2020), https://fox11online.
com/news/coronavirus/faced-with-20000-dead-care-homes-seek-shield-from-lawsuits-05- 
03-2020 [https://perma.cc/5EHF-PH8K].
120. Siobhan Hughes & Jacob Gershman, Liability Shield Is Next Coronavirus Aid 
Battle in Congress, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2020, 6:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
liability-shield-is-next-coronavirus-aid-battle-11588589100 [https://perma.cc/79ZB-5CZP]
(“McConnell . . . has called liability protections a must-have ‘red line’ for Republicans,
saying he won’t support Democrats’ calls for further state and local aid without it.”). 
121. In 18 States, Deaths in Long-Term Care Facilities Account for at Least Half of 
Their COVID-19 Deaths, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/ 
coronavirus-covid-19/slide/in-18-states-deaths-in-long-term-care-facilities-account-for-
at-least-half-of-their-covid-19-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/6NKR-VFS8]. By mid-June, there
were over 50,000 coronavirus deaths in nursing homes in the United States.  Coronavirus 
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the most lives; rather, they provide blanket protections institutions who 
are often already struggling to adequately serve their residents due to “years 
of neglect and chronic underfunding.”122  As a result, even before the
COVID-19 pandemic, many nursing homes did not meet “basic health, safety 
and staffing standards.”123  New liability shields—shields that nursing homes 
have continuously lobbied for even under nonemergency circumstances—
may immunize institutions from ongoing negligent actions124 that may 
have even begun before the pandemic.125 
122. Michael Cantor et al., Reducing COVID-19 Deaths in Nursing Homes: Call to 
Action, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 27, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20200522.474405/full/ [https://perma.cc/78HD-QVQP].
123. Cenziper et al., supra note 119 (“Watchdog groups say the industry used the 
coronavirus emergency to push a longstanding agenda to limit liability and lawsuits.”). 
124. “Standards violations in facilities are common. As many as 3 million infections 
occur in skilled nursing facilities every year, killing 380,000 residents, according to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.  Last year, infection control and prevention problems 
were the most frequently cited issue at nursing homes, and 63% of nursing homes were 
cited for at least one infection control violation in the last two inspection cycles, which go 
back to 2016, according to data analyzed by Kaiser Health News.”  Abigail Abrams, ‘A 
License for Neglect.’ Nursing Homes Are Seeking – and Winning – Immunity Amid the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, TIME (May 14, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://time.com/5835228/nursing- 
homes-legal-immunity-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/SY5Z-NQ85].
125. Faced with 20,000 Dead, Care Homes Seek Shield from Lawsuits, supra note
119 (“What you’re really looking at is an industry that always wanted immunity and now 
has the opportunity to ask for it under the cloak of saying, ‘Let’s protect our heroes.’”).  
Although “nursing homes are not the only players with troubling safety records predating 
COVID,” Jacqueline Stevens, The Problem with Pritzker’s Pandemic Immunity Orders, 
CHI. READER (June 12, 2020), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/pritzker-pandemic- 
immunity-orders-health-care/Content?oid=80608564 [https://perma.cc/863U-VBCY], this
Article focuses primarily on addressing immunity provisions for nursing homes because
of the high incidence of COVID-19 in nursing homes, the fact that nursing homes often 
already struggled to provide adequate care to residents before the pandemic, and nursing 
homes are subject to less oversight–both formal and informal–than other health care 
institutions.  See Bernard Condon & Candice Choi, Nursing Home Outbreaks Lay Bare 
Chronic Industry Problems, PBS (Mar. 21, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/health/nursing-home-outbreaks-lay-bare-chronic-industry-problems [https://
perma.cc/V3FB- FZ2Y] (“Burgeoning coronavirus outbreaks at nursing homes in
Washington, Illinois, New Jersey and elsewhere are laying bare the industry’s long-running
problems, including a struggle to control infections and a staffing crisis . . . .”); Ina Jaffe,
Ideal Nursing Homes: Individual Rooms, Better Staffing, More Accountability, NPR (May
21, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/855821083/ideal-nursing-homes-
individual-rooms-better-staffing-more-accountability [https://perma.cc/GWW5-XKNA]
(explaining that “nursing homes haven’t had to worry about inspectors citing them for 
those failings” because of small fines and minimal oversight); Chris Kirkham & Benjamin 
Lesser, Special Report: Pandemic Exposes Systemic Staffing Problems at U.S. Nursing 
Homes, REUTERS (June 10, 2020, 4:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
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During the pandemic, broad institutional immunity provisions remove 
the last line of protections for residents; due to scarce resources and the 
need to ease some restrictions during emergency circumstances, some 
states have already eased institutional oversight.126 Inspections and other   
oversight mechanisms have been suspended during the pandemic.127  Visitors
are also restricted during the pandemic, and therefore family members and 
friends are unable to check in and help hold facilities accountable if things 
appear improper,128 resulting in little to no institutional accountability and 
coronavirus-nursinghomes-speci/special-report-pandemic-exposes-systemic-staffing-
problems-at-u-s-nursing-homes-idUSKBN23H1L9 [https://perma.cc/GL3D-NZ4T]
(“Insufficient staffing and frequent turnover have caused quality-of-care problems at nursing
homes for decades, studies and government inquiries have shown.”); Richard Mollot,
Nursing Homes Were a Disaster Waiting to Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/opinion/coronavirus-nursing-homes.html [https://perma.cc/
CD8A-79D7] (“The weaknesses in patient care and oversight at nursing homes that made 
those deaths more likely were longstanding, widespread and well known.”); Jordan Rau,
Coronavirus Stress Test: Many 5-Star Nursing Homes Have Infection-Control Lapses, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://khn.org/news/coronavirus-preparedness-
infection-control-lapses-at-top-rated-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/MCS3-8G77] (“Long 
before the novel coronavirus made its surprise appearance, the nation’s nursing homes 
were struggling to obey basic infection prevention protocols designed to halt the spread of
viruses and bacteria they battle daily.”); Jordan Rau & Anna Almendraia, COVID-Plagued
California Nursing Homes Often Had Problems in Past, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 4, 
2020), https://khn.org/news/covid-plagued-california-nursing-homes-often-had-problems-in-
past/ [https://perma.cc/9VFE-R7D6] (“On average, the homes that have had coronavirus
cases had more complaints lodged against them and were fined 29% times more often.  In
addition, Medicare also calculated that their health violations of all types were 20% more
serious.”); Maria Sacchetti & Jon Swaine, Wash. Nursing Home Faces $611,000 Fine 
Over Lapses During Fatal Coronavirus Outbreak, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2020, 2:51 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/wash-nursing-home-faces-611000-fine-
over-lapses-during-fatal-coronavirus-outbreak/2020/04/02/757cee76-7498-11ea-87da-77 
a8136c1a6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/8FD8-F39M] (“CMS said the facility ‘did not have
effective systems in place’ to prevent the infection or respond to it.”). 
126. See Abrams, supra note 1
-
24. 
127. Id.; see also Nina Kohn, Addressing the Crisis in Long-Term Care Facilities, 
HILL (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/494337-addressing
the-crisis-in-long-term-care-facilities?amp [https://perma.cc/BMU6-4AUV] (“In normal 
times, there are three key sources of oversight for nursing homes: state surveyors, ombudsmen 
and family members of residents.  CMS has now banned visits by family and ombudsmen 
except in very limited situations.  It has also hobbled surveyors’ efforts by, among other
things, waiving key disclosure requirements related to staffing that are used to assess
compliance with quality of care standards.  Even enforcement tools have been deliberately
idled: CMS has suspended enforcement of most regulatory violations by nursing homes, 
as well as processes for responding to complaints raised by residents or family members.”). 
128. Letter from Am. Ass’n for Justice Nursing Home Litig. Grp. et al., to Mitch
McConnell, Majority Leader, U.S. Sentate, & Charles Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S. 
Senate (May 28, 2020), https://theconsumervoice.org/uploads/files/issues/senateleadership
immunityltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMP2-TY7Q]. 
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eliminating the deterrent effect of the law.129 
Opponents of broad institutional immunity provisions argue that because
nursing homes are already a major source of negligence in normal times,
immunity provisions will excuse regularly-occurring negligence based on 
the state of emergency.130  Thus, they advocate that “troubled facilities ought
to remain subject to litigation resulting from life-threatening failures in 
infection control and patient care, and families offered a chance to pierce 
the layers of secrecy that often surround unexpected or unexplained deaths.”131 
In essence, many institutional liability provisions cover actions that are
not taken in furtherance of the state’s response to the circumstances of the 
pandemic. Thus, as one article explained, nursing homes should continue 
to be held accountable for negligent behavior.132  Among those that should 
be held accountable are 
Homes that flouted federal guidelines to screen workers, cut off visitations and
end group activities; those that failed to inform residents and relatives of an
outbreak; those that disregarded test results; and homes like one in California,
where at least a dozen employees did not show up for work for two straight days, 
prompting residents to be evacuated.133 
Thus, immunity provisions are really only appropriate when they are
intended to encourage adherence to crisis standards of care—institutional 
or state guidelines that depart from ordinary standards of care but are 
129. Stevens, supra note 125 (“‘The deterrence value from the threat of litigation is 
part of what you’re losing due to the EO, even if at the end of the day certain cases are 
viable in court,’ Kohn explained.”).  But see Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, 
Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1595, 1598 (2002) (finding some, but limited, evidence of the deterrent effect of 
malpractice litigation on medical errors); Nathaniel Hupert et al., Processing the Tort 
Deterrent Signal: A Qualitative Study, 43 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 1 (1996) (identifying potential 
“impediments to the receipt and processing of the tort deterrent signal by individual 
physicians” and calling for institutional liability). 
130. See Cenziper et al., supra note 119. 
131. Id.  Further, Kohn and Roberts argue that existing liability protections may be
sufficient to protect nursing homes from lawsuits.  Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75 (“This 
rhetoric exaggerates the industry’s vulnerability to litigation.  Even without legal immunity, 
COVID-19 could ravage a nursing home—killing most residents—without the facility being 
liable.  This is because, consistent with established tort law doctrines, facilities that operate 
reasonably are unlikely to be liable for COVID-19 related harms, including residents’ 
deaths.”).













     
 
   
 
  
    
  
   
intended to save lives during the pandemic.134  Although this proposal may 
not provide immunity to health care providers or institutions in circumstances 
where they are simply overwhelmed by the number of cases presenting at 
a given moment, the state has not provided guidelines or rules for addressing 
that particular situation. In such circumstances, the inherent flexibility of 
the standard of care should sufficiently protect providers and institutions 
who do their best in the worst of situations from liability, while also allowing 
patients and their loved ones to seek recourse for injuries or deaths that 
occur due to poor decision-making. 
Rather than encouraging nursing homes to provide the best care possible
under difficult circumstances, predicating readmission of residents after 
hospitalization for COVID-related care on liability shields135 holds legislators
and policymakers hostage. In such cases, immunity provisions for institutions 
like nursing homes—which are often for-profit—do not protect the health 
care providers themselves who do their best to care for individuals with 
136 fewer resources, nor do they protect residents.
Further, even during a declaration of emergency, at times viral spread
may become controlled and hospitals may experience less resource scarcity. 
At those times, health care providers and entities will be able to provide 
care at the “normal” nonemergency standard of care.  Thus, broad protections 
that are in effect during the entire duration of the pandemic shield physicians
and health care institutions from liability even in instances where those 
providers and institutions could have provided care pursuant to nonemergency 
circumstances. 
This proposal does not exclude all nursing homes from liability shields 
in all circumstances. Rather, where institutions follow crisis standards of 
care intended to protect their residents and save lives, immunity provisions
may be appropriate.  For example, experts have called for various innovations
intended to reduce deaths due to COVID-19 in nursing homes.137 
134. See, for example, New Jersey’s law, which limits criminal immunity to injury 
or death that occurs due to adherence to a crisis standard of care governing the allocation 
of mechanical ventilators or other scarce medical resources.  S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & 
Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020). 
135. See Stevens, supra note 125 (Nursing home’s CEO’s e-mail to Illinois Governor’s 
chief of staff “implied [nursing home’s] facilities would refuse readmittance of their own 
residents following hospital COVID care unless ‘litigation relief’ were ordered.”). 
136. See id.
 137. See, e.g., Cantor et al., supra note 122 (offering Massachusetts’ initiatives as a 
model, and recommending “1) enhancing infection control with an individualized plan for 
each nursing home that incorporates both regulatory guidance and current literature and is 
feasible to implement; 2) ensuring necessary resources to implement infection control plans, 
especially adequate staff, training, personal protective equipment (PPE), COVID-19 testing, 
creation of units for COVID-19 positive patients, and access to onsite ancillary services (labs, 
imaging, intravenous (IV) management); 3) mirroring the federal Coronavirus Commission for 
996
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Conditioning institutional immunity on following guidance intended to 
protect residents would justify liability protections.138  Finally, instead of
providing broad institutional immunity to these already-underfunded and 
understaffed institutions,139 thereby almost completely insulating providers 
from liability, sufficient resources and support should be afforded so that 
they can provide the best care possible during difficult times. 
Thus, blanket immunity-conferring laws provide liability shields for
decisions made that may have no connection to resource allocation due to
COVID-19, but rather may simply protect an institution or individual health
care provider behaving negligently.  In such cases, immunity provisions
remove the last thing that keeps institutions accountable. 
Safety and Quality in Nursing Homes by establishing state-level task forces focused on
improving communication and collaboration between nursing homes and families, health
care providers (hospitals, health systems, home health agencies, physician organizations), 
and government agencies”); see also Jaffe, supra note 125 (providing “innovating ideas” 
from “[l]ong-time nursing home analysts”); Kohn, supra note 127. 
138. See Abrams, supra note 124. 
139. Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75. 
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